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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

:

v.

:

ROBERT P. HAGEN,

:

Case No. 910017

Category No. 14

Defendant-Respondent. :
REPLY BRIEF
The following points are submitted in reply to the
arguments presented in defendant's responsive brief.
INTRODUCTION
Although the State's opening brief first analyzes the
reservation boundary question and then addresses the Indian
status question, that order of argument should not be construed
as defining the relative significance of the two issues in the
context of this

case.

Because the court of appeals declined the

State's invitation to wait for this Court's decision in State v.
Perank, No. 860196, adopting the view that, "given the Supremacy
Clause and the doctrine of collateral estoppel," this Court could
not reach a decision on the boundary question in Perank contrary
to Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir.
1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986),l the State
was compelled to address in some detail the Perank issue.

Br. of

Pet. at 7-13.
1

State v. Haaen, 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah App. 1990), cert.
granted, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).

However, the boundary question will necessarily be
decided initially in Perank, where a complete record on the issue
exists, and the Perank decision will simply control the
resolution of that issue here.

Indeed, that is how the State

presented the boundary issue to the court of appeals.
Appellee, Case No. 900095-CA, at 5.

Br. of

In terms of the development

of the law, the more significant issue presented by this case is
whether the court of appeals correctly disposed of the Indian
status question.

Thus, the State's primary focus is on the issue

of whether a remand for a determination of defendant's Indian
status should have occurred.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT II
IN ARGUING THAT PRINCIPLES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PRECLUDE A REMAND TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE INDIAN STATUS
QUESTION, DEFENDANT FAILS TO DRAW THE
CRITICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO PROVE JURISDICTION AND
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE GUILT.
Defendant responds to the State's argument for a remand
and reconsideration of the Indian status question by arguing
explicitly what the court of appeals implicitly held:

principles

of double jeopardy prohibit a remand for reconsideration of that
question.

However, like the court of appeals, he fails to

recognize the distinction in double jeopardy law between
procedural error and a finding of insufficient evidence to prove
the crime.

See Burk v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (once a

reviewing court has found the evidence insufficient to sustain a
jury's verdict of guilty, the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a

2

second trial); State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 347 (Utah 1980)
("Reversal and remand for a new trial does not place the accused
in double jeopardy where the error giving rise to the reversal is
merely trial error, as distinguished from insufficiency of the
evidence.M).
As the court in State v. Hutcherson, 790 S.W.2d 532
(Tenn. 1990), correctly noted, a failure to prove venue or
jurisdiction, which are not elements of the crime charged, does
not preclude retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

Such a failure

in proof amounts to an "error in the proceedings," and is not
tantamount to a failure to prove the elements of the crime
charged.

790 S.W.2d at 534-35. This reasoning is entirely

consistent with the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1501(3) (1990), which explicitly states that the existence of
jurisdiction is not an element of the crime.

Thus, the cases

defendant cites which address double jeopardy in the context of
insufficient evidence to prove the crime are inapposite.
The only cases cited by defendant which address a
defect in proof of jurisdiction are State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d
466 (Utah App. 1988), relied on by the court of appeals in
deciding the instant case, see State v. Hacren, 802 P.2d 745, 748
(Utah App. 1990), cert, granted, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991), and
State v. Losolla. 84 N.M. 151, 500 P.2d 436 (1972), a case cited
in Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 470 n.4.

In Sorenson, the court

reversed the defendant's conviction based on the state's failure
to prove jurisdiction as required by section 76-1-501(3) and,
3

without analysis, ordered the defendant discharged.
470.

758 P.2d at

Citing Losolla, it concluded that "[t]his procedure [i.e.,

discharge] is appropriate where reversal is based on a failure of
proof rather than an error in the trial proceedings."
at 470 n.4.

758 P.2d

The flaw in Sorenson's reliance on Losolla is that

the the Losolla court considered jurisdiction to be one of the
essential elements of the charged offense, 84 N.M. at 152, 500
P.2d at 437, a view that is contrary to the plain language of
section 76-1-501(3).

Therefore, the discharge of the defendant

in Sorenson due to the state's failure to prove jurisdiction was
as erroneous as the discharge of defendant in the instant case.
Implicit in defendant's argument is that this Court
should consider unassailable the court of appeals' conclusion
that, applying the applicable test2 to the evidence presented by
2

The court of appeals adopted the following test for
determining Indian status and thus criminal jurisdiction:
"Two elements must be satisfied before it can
be found that [a defendant] is an Indian
under federal law. Initially, it must appear
that he has a significant percentage of
Indian blood. Secondly, the [defendant] must
be recognized as an Indian either by the
federal government or by some tribe or
society of Indians."
Hagen, 802 P.2d at 747 n.2 (quoting Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d
114, 116 (Okl. Crim. 1982)). This is essentially the test that
was argued for by both parties below. Br. of Appellant, Case No.
900095-CA, at 13; Br. of Appellee, Case No. 900095-CA, at 10.
The parties and the court of appeals also agreed that enrollment
in a federally recognized tribe, although a factor to be
considered, is not required to establish Indian status. See
Haaen, 802 P.2d at 747 n.2; Br. of Appellant at 13-14; Br. of
Appellee at 11-12.

4

defendant, "there is simply no way this evidence could be
'weighed' by the trial court to come to the conclusion that the
state had met its burden of proving jurisdiction by proving that
defendant is not an Indian."

Haqen, 802 P.2d at 747. However,

as noted in the State's opening brief, the question of Indian
status for jurisdictional purposes is a question of fact most
appropriately determined in the first instance by the trial
court, which is in the best position to assess the credibility
and weight of the evidence presented.

See United State v.

Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.) (Indian status for
jurisdiction is a question of fact on which the government
carries the burden), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 864 (1984), State v.
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 & n.5 (Utah 1987) (trial court is in
best position to assess credibility and weight of evidence).
Here, in finding that defendant was not an Indian, the
trial court relied most heavily on the fact that defendant was
not a member of a federally recognized tribe (T. 25-26) (see Br.
of Pet. at 5), and did not state which of the other evidence
presented by defendant it found credible or what weight it
attached to it (.id.). Had the trial court made specific findings
of fact favorable to defendant concerning that other evidence
(see Br. of Pet. at 3-4, for summary of evidence presented by
defendant), perhaps the court of appeals could have reached the
conclusion that it did, but those specific findings of fact were
not made.

Moreover, the trial court, as a part of the local

community, is presumably more familiar with Indian affairs than
5

an appellate court which sits over a hundred miles away in a
large city, and therefore is generally in a better position than
the appellate court to resolve the factual question of whether
the Indian community recognizes defendant as an Indian (community
recognition being the second prong of the test for determining
Indian status, see n.2, supra, and perhaps the determinative
factor in this case).3
Furthermore, although the court of appeals accepted the
parties' position that the state carries the ultimate burden of
proving jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, Hagen,
802 P.2d at 747, it did not make clear whether a defendant must
present a prima facie case of Indian status before the burden
shifts to the state to prove that the defendant is not an Indian.
As noted in the State's opening brief, the State has argued in
this case and in Perank that, to raise a jurisdictional question,

3

The State acknowledges that the prosecutor conceded a
number of factual points below: (1) that defendant is a member
of the Little Shell Band of the Chippewa Indians; (2) that
defendant is a Pembina descendant; (3) that defendant resides in
Myton, Utah, where he owns a home; and (4) that defendant
receives some Indian medical benefits (T. 17-18). However, the
prosecutor argued that defendant's 5/16ths Indian blood is "half
as much as what it takes for local enrollment [in the Ute Tribe],
"that defendant is not recognized as an Indian for purposes of
Ute Tribal Court jurisdiction (attachment to Defendant's Exhibit
6), that so many people in the area receive IHS medical benefits
that "the chairman of the [Ute] Tribal Business Committee has
complained and gone back to Washington [to complain]," and that
defendant had not demonstrated any "real ties" to the Ute Tribe
or Reservation beyond attendance at pow wows and tribal business
meetings which, the prosecutor suggested, would not be uncommon
for many persons in the area who are not Indian (T. 19-21). In
short, the prosecutor argued that defendant was not recognized as
an Indian by the Indian community — a factual question not
explicitly resolved by the trial court.

6

a defendant carries the initial burden of producing prima facie
evidence to establish Indian status —
mere suppositions or allegations.

evidence that goes beyond

Br. of Pet. at 14. Assuming

that this is the applicable standard4, the trial court should
make the initial determination of whether this threshold burden
has been met, not an appellate court.

Again, the trial court is

in the best position to assess the credibility of the evidence
presented and to determine whether it goes beyond "mere
suppositions or allegations."
In short, the court of appeals impermissibly engaged in
independent fact finding, based on an apparent misunderstanding
of the law of double jeopardy and avoidance of established
standards for resolving questions of fact.

Defendant has neither

justified, through legal analysis, the court of appeals' refusal
to remand the case for reconsideration of the Indian status
question under a correct allocation of the burden of proof and a
proper standard of proof, nor demonstrated that the State's
arguments for remand are not grounded in established law.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of appeals'
A

The Court should make explicit that this is the applicable
standard. If it were not, and the defendant did not have this
initial burden, the state would be placed in the difficult and
unreasonable position of having to prove a negative — that the
defendant is not an Indian — based solely on the defendant's
unsupported assertion of Indian status. The court of appeals
suggested approval of this latter standard when it observed that
"even if the [trial] court chose to discredit defendant's
testimony completely, the result would be that there is no
evidence in the record at all concerning defendant's Indian or
non-Indian statusf, and] [t]he state simply could not meet its
burden in the absence of any evidence establishing jurisdiction."
Hagen, 802 P.2d at 747-48.
7

holding that remand was prohibited and, if the resolution of the
Perank issue so requires, order the necessary remand.
REPLY TO POINT I
THIS COURT IS ENTITLED TO DETERMINE STATE
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION REGARDLESS OF ANY
RULINGS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS.
Defendant claims that the State and the Utah courts are
bound by the decision of the en banc panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Ute Indian Tribe v.
State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert,
denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986).

That proposition is incorrect.5

The issue is whether the courts of the State of Utah have
criminal jurisdiction over this particular defendant.
State argued in Perank, Utah's courts —
Circuit —

As the

not the the Tenth

should make that determination.
The jurisdictional question hinges on whether the crime

was committed by an Indian within the confines of an Indian
reservation.

As in Perank, the issue is whether the Uintah

Valley Reservation was disestablished when it was opened by
Congress in 1905 (see Perank, Br. of Resp. at 17-48).

That

determination is not a factual question, but requires
interpretation of the specific congressional acts dealing with
the opening of the Uintah Valley Reservation.

5

The key is to

As discussed in the Introduction above, the central issue
in this case is whether defendant is an Indian. If that is
determined in the negative, whether the crime was or was not
committed within an Indian reservation becomes irrelevant. See
Br. of Pet. at 15-16 n.5.

8

determine congressional

intent,

since some surplus land acts

diminished reservations and some did not.
U.S. 463, 468-70 (1984).

Solem v. Bartlett, 465

This Court is entitled to its own views

as to the effect and intent of the acts dealing with the Uintah
Valley Reservation, since that question affects state court
jurisdiction over virtually the whole Uintah Basin.
Utah's citizens —

both Indian and non-Indian —

Thousands of

are affected.

If this Court wishes to let the federal courts
determine state court jurisdiction, that is certainly its
perogative.

However, the issues in this case (and in Perank) go

to the core of state court jurisdiction, and Utah's courts should
be and are entitled to make that determination themselves.

This

is especially true when the Tenth Circuit's decision is erroneous
and indeed has been questioned by the Tenth Circuit itself in the
subsequent case of Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Company v.
Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 581
(1990) (see discussion in the State's opening brief, Br. of Pet.
at 9-13).

This basic jurisdictional determination should not be

precluded by "collateral estoppel" or the like.
defendant is not seeking to estop the State

In reality,

from arguing that the

state court has jurisdiction; he is really arguing that

this

Court is barred from making its own determination on
jurisdiction.
As a matter of general law, state courts are not bound
by decisions of federal circuit courts of appeals.

In United

States v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402
9

U.S. 983 (1971), the court held that while a decision of the
United States Supreme Court on federal law has a binding effect
on all courts (state or federal), the federal circuit courts of
appeals exercise no supervisory jurisdiction over state
tribunals, and their decisions are not binding on state courts —
even as to matters of federal law.

432 F.2d at 1075-76. Accord

People v. Luros, 4 Cal.3d 84, 92 Cal.Rptr. 833, 480 P.2d 633
(1971), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971); State v. Harmon, 107
Idaho 73, 685 P.2d 814, 817 (1984); In re Sinclair, 197 Mont. 29,
640 P.2d 918, 920 (1982); Bargas v. Warden, 87 Nev. 30, 482 P.2d
317 (1971), cert, denied, 403 U.S. 935 (1971); First Wyoming Bank
v. Trans-Mountain Sales & Leasing, Inc., 602 P.2d 1219, 1225
(Wyo. 1979).

The great weight of authority thus runs directly

contrary to the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals below that
the "Supremacy Clause" of the United States Constitution somehow
makes the Ute Indian Tribe decision binding on Utah's state
courts.6
The South Dakota Supreme Court has not been reluctant
to disagree with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on questions
regarding disestablishment of Indian reservations.

In both

DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 430-31 (1975),
6

The court of appeals assertion in this context that it had
"not been acquainted with the precise arguments advanced by the
state in Perank," Hagen, 802 P.2d at 747, is curious, in that the
parties' briefs in Perank had been filed in that court and the
case had been set for oral argument before the court of appeals
decided to certify the case to this Court (see Addendum). One
would think that the court of appeals was fully aware of the
State's and the defendant's arguments in Perank, and that is why
the case was certified up for decision.
10

and Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984), the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari specifically because of
conflicting decisions by the Eighth Circuit and the South Dakota
Supreme Court on whether or not a specific reservation had been
disestablished.

In the series of cases leading up to Solem, the

Eighth Circuit first held that the Cheyenne River Reservation had
not been disestablished.
(8th Cir. 1973).

United States v. Erickson, 478 F.2d 684

That case was a habeas corpus proceeding in

federal court against the State of South Dakota through the
warden of the state penitentiary.

In 1977, the South Dakota

Supreme Court issued a decision in Stankev v. Waddel, 256 N.W.2d
117 (S.D. 1977).

That case was a suit by a member of the

Cheyenne River Tribe challenging the taxation of her personal
property by the local county.

The South Dakota Court of Appeals

ruled the tax invalid based on the Eighth Circuit's ruling in
Erickson.

The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed, disagreeing

with the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the acts which opened
the Cheyenne River Reservation.

256 N.W.2d at 119.

In 1979, the

Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Duoris, 612 F.2d 319 (8th
Cir. 1979), vacated, 446 U.S. 980 (1980), again ruled that the
Cheyenne River Reservation had not been disestablished.

In 1982,

the South Dakota Supreme Court again disagreed in the case of
State v. Janis, 317 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 1982).
criminal prosecution against a tribal member.

That case was a
In fairly strong

language, the South Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with the
Eighth Circuit's decisions, stating that the federal circuit
11

court had misinterpreted the acts opening the reservation.

317

N.W.2d at 137. The United States Supreme Court finally settled
the dispute in Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).

Nowhere

in either Solem or DeCoteau did the United States Supreme Court
even intimate that the South Dakota Supreme Court was bound or
precluded by the contrary decisions of the Eighth Circuit.
Significantly, the Ute Indian Tribe case is not the
first time either the Utah Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit has
touched upon the status of the Uintah Valley Reservation.
Shortly after Congress opened the reservation to settlement by
non-Indians, the Utah Supreme Court, in Sowards v. Meagher, 37
Utah 212, 108 P. 1112 (1910), and Whiterocks Irrigation Co. v.
Mooseman, 45 Utah 79, 141 P. 459 (1914), recognized that the
unallotted land within the original reservation boundaries had
been "restored to the public domain."

In 1946, the Tenth Circuit

itself stated that the Act of 1.902 had restored the unallotted
lands to the public domain.

Hanson v. United States, 153 F.2d

162 (10th Cir. 1946).
In the 1970's, the question of the status of the Uintah
Valley Reservation was specifically considered by this Court.
The Court concluded that the original Uintah Valley Reservation
had ceased to exist, but did so without detailed discussion.
Brough v. Apparowa, 553 P.2d 934 (Utah 1976), vacated, 431 U.S.
901 (1977).

Pursuant to a petition for a writ of certiorari

filed in Brough, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of
12

Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).

However, when

Brouah was remanded to the trial court by the Utah Supreme Court,
it was then removed to the federal district court (U.S. District
Judge Willis Ritter had previously restrained the State from
proceeding in reliance on Brouah).

The case was ultimately

dismissed without any state court having reconsidered the
reservation issue in light of Rosebud.7
It is also important to note the different contexts in
which the instant case and Ute Indian Tribe arose.

Ute Indian

Tribe was an action by the tribe for declaratory judgment as to
the geographic area in which the Ute Law & Order Code is
applicable.

Ute Indian Tribe was to determine the boundaries for

purposes of tribal jurisdiction over its own members.8

However,

this case has nothing to do with tribal jurisdiction.

It has

only to do with whether federal jurisdiction preempts state
criminal jurisdiction.
this case or Perank.

The State did not "manufacture" either
It simply is attempting to preserve state

court criminal jurisdiction in response to a direct challenge to
that jurisdiction by defendant.

Again, the jurisdiction of

7

Even the United States, as amicus curiae before the
United States Supreme Court in opposing certiorari on Ute Indian
Tribe, conceded that despite the decisions on the boundary
question by the lower federal courts, the Utah courts might again
be called upon to consider the boundary issue. (See Perank, Br.
of Resp. at 6-7, for the exact quote from the Solicitor General's
brief.)
8

The Ute Law & Order Code defines "Indian" as "any person
of Indian descent who is a member of any recognized
tribe
under
federal
jurisdiction."
Ute Law & Order Code, § 1-8-9(1)
(emphasis added). Defendant is not a member of the Ute Tribe, or
of a federally recognized tribe.
13

Utah's state courts should not be usurped solely by a
questionable legal interpretation of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments and those contained in
the State's opening brief, this Court should reverse the court of
appeals' holding that the case could not be remanded for
reconsideration of defendant's Indian status and that this Court
is bound by the Tenth Circuit's decision in Ute Indian Tribe.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

of December,

1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON
"
Assistant Attorney General

MICHAEL M. QUEALY
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Reply Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Joel
D. Berrett, Attorneys for Defendant, P.O. Box 262, Roosevelt,
Utah 84066-0262, this £ 7 ^ M a y of December, 1991.
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ADDENDUM

-ooOooState of Utah# Department of
Social Services,

]
]

Plaintiff and Respondent,]\
)

CERTIFICATION TO
UTAH SUPREME COURT

i

•

•

Case No. 860048-CA

Daniel S. Vijil,
Defendant and Appellant, \
State of Utah,

j

Plaintiff and Respondent,;
v

*

I•

Clinton Perank,

Case No. 860196-CA

]

Defendant and Appellant.. ]

Upon an affirmative vote of at least four judges, the Utah
Court of Appeals, sua sponte certifies the above-entitled cases
to the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(3)
U.C.A. (1986 Suppl) and R. Utah Ct. App. 4B.
It is hereby ordered that the above cases be certified to
the Supreme Court for original appellate review and
determination; all records on appeal, briefs, and all papers
filed in this Court shall be immediately transferred to the
Utah Supreme Court for further proceedings there.
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